This course will focus on how to apply the basic principles of game theory and information economics in strategic thinking. The main content will follow the framework of Dixit et al. (2009). More specifically, this course is organized into three parts:

Part I: Concepts and techniques
1 Rationality and equilibrium
2 Non-cooperative and cooperative games
3 Sequential and simultaneous moves
4 Discrete and continuous strategies
5 Zero-sum and non-zero-sum games
6 Pure and mixed strategies

Part II: Some broad classes of games and strategies
7 Uncertainty and information
8 Strategic moves
9 Prisoners’ dilemma and repeated games
10 Collective-action games
11 Evolutionary games
12 Mechanism design

Part III: Applications to specific strategic situations
13 Brinkmanship
14 Strategy and voting
15 Bidding strategy and auction design
16 Bargaining
17 Markets and competition

It is worth noting that this course has its theoretical basis attributed to many of the Nobel laureates in economics, including:

2009 - Elinor Ostrom, Oliver E. Williamson
2007 - Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin, Roger B. Myerson
2005 - Robert J. Aumann, Thomas C. Schelling
2001 - George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence, Joseph E. Stiglitz
1996 - James A. Mirrlees, William Vickrey
1994 - John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr., Reinhard Selten
1993 - Douglass C. North
1991 - Ronald H. Coase
1986 - James M. Buchanan Jr.
1982 - George J. Stigler
1978 - Herbert A. Simon
1974 - Friedrich A. von Hayek
1972 - Kenneth J. Arrow